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Murph: The Implied Partnership: Equitable Alternative to Contemporary Me

NOTES
THE IMPLIED PARTNERSHIP: EQUITABLE ALTERNATIVE
TO CONTEMPORARY METHODS OF
POSTMARITAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
Women's Liberation is men's liberation too. No more alimony ...
no more so-called "Jewish mothers" who are simply normally ambitious human beings with all their ambitiousness confined to the house;
no more wives who fall apart at the first wrinkle because they've been
taught their total identity depends on the outsides; no more responsibility for another human being who has never been told she is responsible for her own life, and who sooner or later says some version of, "If
I hadn't married you, I would have been a star." And let's hear it one
more time - no more alimony.1
-Gloria Steinem
Traditional legal, social, economic, and political norms have created
numerous disabilities for the married woman. For example, at common law
a married woman had no right of action against her spouse, since the two
were legally one person, and that person was the husband.2 To compensate
the wife for such disabilities, certain legal protections have evolved includ-

ing dower, 3 support rights, 4 alimony, 5 and community property. 6 In recent
years, however, there has been a movement to equalize the societal roles of
men and women,7 as manifested by the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
to the United States Constitution s and Florida's new "no-fault" marriage
1. SOLDMRS MAGAZINE, May 1973, at 8.

2. See 1 BLAcxsrONE, COMMENTAREs

ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND §§598, 599 (Jones ed.
1915); W. LEwIs, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 411 (1900); Note, The Equal
Rights Amendment, 31 FED. B.J. 247 (1972).
3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §731.34 (Supp. 1972).
4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §61.09 (1971).
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §61.08 (1971).
6. Community property is property earned by either spouse during the marriage. The
other spouse immediately acquires an undivided one-half interest in such property. The
community property states are: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, and Washington. W. MACDONALD, FRAtm ON THE WIDow's SHARE 21 nA (1960).
7. See, e.g., FLA. CONsr. art. X, §5, which provides there shall be no distinction between
the property rights of married women and those of married men.
8. On March 22, 1972, the following constitutional amendment was submitted to the
state legislatures for ratification pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. V:
"Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any state on account of sex.
"Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
"Section 3.This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification."
For possible ramifications of the proposed amendment on various fields of law, see Bayh,
The Equal Rights Amendment, 6 IND. L. REv. 1 (1972); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman,
The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80
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dissolution statute. 9 For example, Florida's dissolution statute, couched in
sexually neutral terms, empowers a trial court to award either spouse alimony pendente lite,o permanent alimony,11 or separate maintenance. 12
The movement toward sexual equality has also generated other changes
in marriage and divorce law.13 The Florida supreme court recently noted:
"The unity concept of marriage has in large part given way to the partner
concept whereby a married women stands as an equal to her husband in the
eyes of the law."14 An important result of this trend toward equality has
been an erosion of the legal safeguards previously developed to protect the

YALE L.J. 871 (1971); Note, The "Equal Rights" Amendment: An Overview, 31 FED. B.J. 247
(1972); Note, The "Equal Rights" Amendment -Positive Panacea or Negative Nostrum?, 59
KY. L.J. 953 (1971); Note, The Equal Rights Amendment: A New Reasonableness Test for
Viewing Sex-Based Classifications,4 LOYOLA U.L.J. (Chicago) 69 (1973).
Pursuant to U.S. CONsT. art. V, three-fourths of the states must ratify the proposed amendment before it can be incorporated into the Constitution. As of this writing, thirty of the
necessary thirty-eight states have ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). According to
Senator Birch Bayh, chances of ultimate ratification are substantial assuming public interest
is sustained. See Bayh, supra.
Because the proposed amendment prohibits all sexual discrimination, any law placing a
greater burden of family support on the husband by virtue of his sex would be invalid. While
Florida's non-support statute, FLA. STAT. §61.09 (1971), conforms to ERA standards other
Florida laws continue to categorically assign primary family support responsibility to the
husband. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §708.10(1) (1971): "This law shall not be construed as: (1)
Relieving a husband from any duty of supporting and maintaining his wife and children."
Furthermore, a husband has traditionally been held liable to third parties who provide
means of support to his wife and children. See, e.g., Phillips v. Sanchez, 35 Fla. 187, 17 So.
363 (1895). Passage of the ERA would compel abolition of such paternal obligations unless
corresponding duties or liabilities were conferred upon the wife.
9. FLA. STAT. ch. 61 (1971).
10. FLA. STAT. §61.071 (1971).
11. FLA. STAT. §61.08 (1971). In Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973), the Florida
supreme court dealt with the allegation that the Dissolution of Marriage Act, FIA. STAT.
ch. 61 (1971), adversely affected the property rights of a spouse by impairing the spouse's
ability to procure alimony upon dissolution. The court held that potential alimony was not
a property right provided for by the marital contract so as to fall within the proscription
against the impairment of contracts in FLA. CONsT. art. I, §10. In upholding the statute the
court recognized that dissolution of marriage is a legislative prerogative and, therefore, the
statute does not encroach upon the judiciary.
12. FLA. STAT. §61.09 (1971).
13. Insight into the changing attitude of Florida's judiciary can be gained by an examination of recent decisions. In Ashmore v. Ashmore, 251 So. 2d 15 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971),
the ability of a married woman to establish a domicile apart from that of her husband was
initially recognized. Such a view is contrary to the common law unity concept of a marriage
whereby the marital entity is capable of only one domicile. Id. at 16. Gates v. Foley, 247
So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971), established the right of a married woman to recover for loss of consortium, a right recognized by common law as belonging only to the husband. In Markham
v. Markham, 265 So. 2d 59 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973), the court
held a husband was not entitled to record his wife's phone conversations without her permission. Rejecting the notion of a wife's subservience to her husband, the court reasoned
that spouses are now viewed as partners, the wife being the legal equal of her spouse. Id.
at 62.
14. Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 1971).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss2/3

2

Murph: The Implied Partnership: Equitable Alternative to Contemporary Me
1974]

THE IMPLIED PARTNERSHIP

married woman. 15 Consequently, a married woman wishing to remain in the
traditional family role may soon find herself in a continued subordinate societal role, but without historical marital protections. One possible solution
to this growing dilemma is a wider use of the implied partnership concept 6
in postmarital property settlements.
Generally, only family businesses in which both the husband and wife
actively engage in the business permit implication of a partnership between
the spouses. With a broader view of the interspousal relationship, however,
a partnership could be implied in other situations. For example, the implied
partnership theory appears particularly applicable to those situations in
which the wife, rather than directly assisting in the family business, is primarily engaged in household maintenance. The housewife, if held to be an
implied partner with her businessman-husband, would thus possess a property right in the business. Such an extension of the implied partnership concept would be consistent with the developing movement to equalize the social positions of men and women and would also replace some of the vanishing legal protections traditionally afforded married women. This note will
examine the commercial and, to a lesser extent, the domestic and tort ramifications of imposing an implied partnership in a family business arrangement.
THE IMPLIED PARTNERSHIP

CONCEPT

A contract is normally a fundamental prerequisite to the formation of a
partnership.17 The contract, however, may be implied as well as express.' 8
When implied, the necessary intent to carry on a business as co-partners can
be inferred from the acts and conduct of the parties or the attendant facts
and circumstances.' 9 Thus, partnerships frequently exist where the members
20
are unaware that they are de jure partners.
The implied partnership is a creature of inherent judicial equity powers,
invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. 2' Historically, in annulment proceedings many courts have used inherent equity powers to create
15. See, e.g., Emhart Corp. v. Brantley, 257 So. 2d 272 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972), which held
that Fla. Laws 1927, ch. 2, §5866, at 1924 (repealed 1970), providing that a wife's separate
property was not liable for her husband's debts absent her written consent, was inconsistent with FLA. CONST. art. X, §5, and not carried over as a statute under the 1968 constitution.
16. The implied partnership stands on equal legal footing with the express partnership.
See Eggleston v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 668, 47 S.E.2d 243 (1948). An implied partnership arises
by inferring a partnership agreement from the parties' conduct and surrounding circumstances. Id. at 674, 47 S.E.2d at 247.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. id.
20. See Silliman, Partnership- The Uniform Act and the FloridaLaw, 5 U. FLA. L. REV.
281, 286 (1952).
21. See, e.g., Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, 19 So. 172 (1896), where the court found an
implied partnership to prevent the defrauding of creditors.
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partnerships22 or quasi-partnerships2 3 as a device for settling property disputes over rights acquired during an illicit relationship or under a void
marriage.24 Similarly, an implied partnership could be created between
spouses to protect rights of either the husband or the wife upon marriage
termination.25
Since the partnership concept embraces business carried on for profit, an
implied partnership may not be created unless the spouses depend on an independent business for support. 26 Thus, an implied partnership could not exist
if the wife were a homemaker and the husband a wage earner. Assuming
the proper circumstances, however, there appears to be no valid reason why
the implied partnership theory could not be used upon dissolution of
marriage where the prerequisite commercial enterprise exists.
PRESENT STATUS OF THE IMPLIED PARTNERSHIP IN RELATION TO
FAMILY BUSINESSES

An interest analogous to rights acquired in an implied partnership has
been previously recognized in marital property settlements in Florida.
"Special equities" have been awarded the wife upon marital dissolution due
to her financial contributions to the business 2 7 or material contributions of
services that augmented her husband's property accumulations.28 Nevertheless, a major limitation of this special equity remedy exists in that performance of "ordinary marital duties" does not entitle the wife to any equity in
her husband's assets. 49 Rather, something above and beyond the performance
of such traditional duties must exist before an equity will be found to inure
to the wife. 30 To maintain that a wife has a duty to perform household chores
and yet to hold that performance of them entitles her to no right in her
husband's assets is, however, anachronistic. In many situations involving
family businesses the assets were accrued in large part because the wife's

22. See, e.g., Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash. 110, 176 P. 22 (1918); Brenchley v. Brenchley,
96 Wash. 223, 164 P. 913 (1917).
23. See, e.g., Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30, 190 P. 1088 (1920).
24. Unless rebutted, the spouses are presumed to be equal partners when such a partnership created and property acquired during the relationship is equally divided. See, e.g.,
Hupp v. Hupp, 235 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
25. See, e.g., Hogan v. Hogan, 234 Ark. 383, 352 S.W.2d 184 (1961).
26. A partnership conducted by husband and wife should involve the element of carrying on a commercial enterprise for profit. Mere co-ownership of property is not sufficient.
See Northampton Brewery Corp. v. Lande, 138 Pa. Super. 235, 10 A.2d 583 (1939).
27. See, e.g., Dupree v. Dupree, 156 Fla. 455, 23 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1945).
28. See, e.g., Engebretsen v. Engebretsen, 151 Fla. 372, 11 So. 2d 322 (1942), where the
wife was awarded a two-fifths interest in her husband's assets after thirteen years of living
above a marine-hardware store and running the business alone, much of the time while
rearing two children and a stepson. But see Welsh v. Welsh 160 Fla. 380, 35 So. 2d 6 (1948)
(wife awarded no special equity notwithstanding eight years of work in the family drug
store); accord, Levison v. Levison, 193 So. 2d 630 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
29. See, e.g., Welsh v. Welsh, 160 Fla. 380, 35 So. 2d 6 (1948).
30. Id.
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domestic functions enabled the husband to concentrate his efforts entirely
on the business.
A further drawback of the special equity theory is that a prerequisite to
its imposition 3' is the rebuttal of the presumption that a wife who advances
capital to her husband intends a gift.3 2 Failure to rebut the presumption
leaves a wife owning no separate, individual property and with alimony as
her only potential means of compensation for years of marriage-a none too
secure result in an era where the practice of awarding alimony is alien to
contemporary trends.3 3 The shortcomings of the special equity theory thus
require that an alternative concept, such as the implied partnership, be
utilized.
Implication of a partnership between spouses has been advocated in
previous Florida cases without success. 3 4 In Kochan v. American Fire &
Casualty Co. 3 5 a surety attempted to base indemnity liability of a wife upon
a partnership theory. The surety relied, in part, on a memorandum purporting to establish a joint venture between the husband and the wife.3 6 The
writing, however, made no mention of joint control or the right of the
spouses to share in the profits, so the wife was held not liable on the partner37
ship theory.
Courts in other jurisdictions have not been so reluctant to find a partnership relationship between husband and wife. In Hogan v. Hogan38 a wife
was found to be a partner in her husband's stockyard business notwithstanding the lack of any oral or written partnership agreement or capital contribution by the wife. At the time of the marriage the husband owned the
business in which the wife was employed as a bookkeeper. Profits were subsequently shared by the spouses, and the parties filed a partnership return in
reporting their income. 39 The wife continued to work as a bookkeeper sub-

31. See Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
32. The presumption is not easily rebutted. See, e.g., Calligarich v. Calligarich, 256
So. 2d 60 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
33. See SOLDIMS MAGAZINE, supra note 1, at 8.
34. See Kochan v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 200 So. 2d 213 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1967);
Levison v. Levison, 193 So. 2d 630 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Gaer v. Gaer, 168 So. 2d 789 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1964). But cf. Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1971).
35. 200 So. 2d 213 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
36. See Silliman, supra note 20, at 289 for a comparison of the partnership and joint
venture.
37. Ultimate liability was predicated, however, on an independent indemnity agreement
executed by the wife in favor of the creditor. 200 So. 2d at 218. Other courts have reached

similar results by affirming decisions without opinion. Typically, the court states: "No useful purpose would be served by a detailed discussion of the facts." Gaer v. Gaer, 168 So. 2d
789, 790 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
38. 234 Ark. 383, 352 S.W.2d 184 (1961).
39. Although a factor often considered, the filing of a partnership tax return by the
spouses is not essential to the implication of a partnership, nor will its existence compel
the finding of a partnership. Compare Farm Bureau Agricultural Credit Corp. v. Dicke, 29
Ohio App. 2d 1, 277 N.E.2d 562 (1972) (implied partnership found without relying on a

partnership tax return), with Keller v. Keller, 4 Ill. App. 3d 89, 280 N.E.2d 281 (1972) (no
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sequent to the marriage but was paid no salary. Upon dissolution of the
marriage the wife was held to own a one-half undivided interest in the stockyard business.40 The Arkansas supreme court noted that contributions of
skill or other things necessary to accomplish the purpose of making money
41
were sufficient to form a partnership.
Thus, the determinative aspect of a wife's right to share in her husband's
assets under an implied partnership theory is the quantum of commercial
interrelationship between the wife and the businessman-husband. Important
factors cited by some courts as bearing on this aspect include: contributions
of labor or capital, or both, 42 the existence of a joint bank account,43 joint
ownership of realty and chattels, 4 the existence of an agreement or contract,45 sharing in the profits and losses, 46 and the filing of a partnership tax
47

return by the spouses.

Other more tenuous interrelationships should also satisfy the requirements for partnership implication and entitle the wife to partnership status.
For example, in Hogan v. Hogan48 the court recognized that contribution
of services necessary to accomplish a money-making purpose will create a
partnership interest in the contributor. 49 Additionally, it suggested that if
property is accumulated through the joint, though dissimilar, labor of husband and wife, the wife's interest should be protected.50
The emerging view of the martial relationship disregards the unified
entity concept and perceives the marriage as a bifurcated structure, with the
husband and wife acting within their respective roles toward achievement
of a common purpose. 5 1 Absent the services rendered by the homemaker-wife,
the husband would be forced to seek such services elsewhere at personal

partnership found despite the existence of a partnership return).
40. 234 Ark. at 388, 352 S.W.2d at 186. In an earlier case, Williams v. Williams, 186
Ark. 160, 52 S.W.2d 971 (1932), the same court had upheld the finding of a husband and
wife partnership in the family dry cleaning business. Awarding the wife one-half of the
property, the court noted: "If [husband and wife] by their joint work, labor and management, acquired the property, a court of equity would . . . protect the wife's interest in the
property." Id. at 161, 52 S.W.2d at 973.
41. Id. at 387, 352 S.W.2d at 186.
42. See Farm Bureau Agricultural Credit Corp. v. Dicke, 29 Ohio App. 2d 1, 277 N.E.2d
562 (1972).
43. Id. But see Cagan v. Cagan, 56 Misc. 2d 1045, 291 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
44. See Farm Bureau Agricultural Credit Corp. v. Dicke, 29 Ohio App. 2d 1, 277 N.E.2d
562 (1972).
45. See McGehee v. McGehee, 227 Miss. 170, 85 So. 2d 799 (1956).
46. See Kochan v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 200 So. 2d 213 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
47. See Eggleston v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 668, 47 S.E.2d 243 (1948).
48. 234 Ark. 383, 352 S.W.2d 184 (1962). See also Phillips v. Phillips, 236 Ark. 225, 365
S.W.2d 261 (1963) (grocery store); Williams v. Williams, 186 Ark. 160, 52 S.W.2d 971 (1932)
(dry cleaners); McGehee v. McGehee, 227 Miss. 160, 85 So. 2d 799 (1956) (trucking business);
Eggleston v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 668, 47 S.E.2d 243 (1948) (filling station); Farm Bureau
Agricultural Credit Corp. v. Dicke, 29 Ohio App. 2d 1, 277 N.E.2d 562 (1972) (farm).
49. 234 Ark. at 387, 352 S.W.2d at 186.
50. 234 Ark. at 388, 352 S.W.2d at 186.
51. See, e.g., Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971).
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expense. By performing daily domestic chores the housewife frees the husband to concentrate his efforts entirely on the business. Hence, the homemaker should be entitled to a partnership share in the same manner as a
wife who participates actively in the family business.
MECHANICS OF UTILIZING THE COMMERCIAL

MODEL:

IMPACT OF THE UNIFORM

PARTNERSHIP ACT

With the common law disabilities inherent in her status, a married
woman was without capacity to assume the legal obligations of a co-partner
with her husband.5 2 Although this specific disability was abrogated in Florida
by passage of the Free Dealer Law of 194353 and the Married Women's Act
of 1943,- the spouses' community property, in and of itself, did not comprise
partnership property. 55 On the contrary, it had to be demonstrated that the
spouses intended their property to be partnership property before it would
be treated as such. 56
Prior to enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act(UPA),5 7 Florida
partnership law was an amorphous, unpredictable body of precedents. 58
Cases were decided on an ad hoc basis by choosing whatever common law
concepts led to the desired result.5 9 With the UPA's enactment Florida courts
now have statutory guidelines60 to aid in determination of a partnership's

52. See Foster v. Cooper, 143 Fla. 493, 197 So. 117 (1940); De Graum, Aymar & Co. v.
Jones, 23 Fla. 83, 6 So. 925 (1887).
53. Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 2196, at 585 (repealed 1970).
54. FLA. STAT. §708.09 (1971) provides: "Every married woman may enter into agreements
and contracts with her husband, may become the partner of her husband or others
See Nock v. Wayble, 59 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1952).
55. [1957-1958] FLA. Arr'' GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 912, 915.
56. [1957-1958] FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 912, 915.
57. FLA. STAT. §§620.55-.77 (Supp. 1972).
58. See Silliman, supra note 20, at 292-93. Florida did not have any statute regulating
general partnership affairs until 1972 despite wide use of this form of business organization.
Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71, §§1-4, dealing with acquisition, conveyance, and encumberance of
partnership property, was enacted. The statute was subsequently repealed by Fla. Laws 1972,
ch. 108, §44.
59. Compare A.J. Richey Corp. v. Garvey, 132 Fla. 602, 182 So. 216 (1938) (existence of
partnership tested by examining parties' intent), with Winnefield v. Truitt, 71 Fla. 38, 70
So. 775 (1916) (parties held liable as general partners despite their intent to be stockholders
in a corporation).
60. In addition, a fertile field of case law is available from other jurisdictions that have
adopted the UPA, and decisions from these jurisdictions should prove to be persuasive
precedent for Florida courts construing the UPA. For a historical appraisal of the UPA, see
Silliman, supra note 20, at 281. Since 1914 when the American Bar Association approved the
final draft proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
forty-three states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Guam have adopted the
act. 6 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr at 5 (table) (Supp. 1973). It has been advocated that UPA
principles apply to control and management problems of marital property in community
property states. See Note, How Much of a Partnership is a Marriage?, 23 HAsiNgs L.J. 249
(1971).
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existence,61 effect,62 extent, 63 and manner of termination. 64
Faced with the task of implying a partnership upon termination of a
marriage, a court utilizing the UPA could basically take one of the three
approaches in solving the problem: (1) command strict adherence to the
statutes, (2) supplement the statutes with equitable concepts, or (3) reach
a decision without considering the UPA. Employing the first approach does
not appear to be sound. Strict adherence to the UPA would run afoul of
many existing laws regulating the martial relationship. For example, the
UPA makes partners jointly and severally liable for the torts of one partner
acting "in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the
authority of his copartners." 65 Nevertheless, under another statute a husband
is not liable for the torts of his wife. 66 Discretion should thus be exercised

in following the UPA strictly so that a realistic, equitable application of the
implied partnership theory can be achieved under the ambit of all relevant
statutes.
Furthermore, when no creditors or partners exist, other than the husband
and wife, the need for strict adherence to the UPA is lacking. 67 The UPA's
chief value lies in the interstitial role it plays. 68 Many terms of the Act are
operative only when the parties have omitted necessary provisions in their
partnership agreement. Additionally, most of the UPA's provisions can be
altered by agreement of the parties. 69 Thus, a court should be able to reach
a decision without strictly applying the Act when third parties are not
affected. Consequently, supplementing the UPA with equitable concepts
appears to be a more desirable approach in partnership implication than
strict adherence to, or complete disregard of, the Act.
CRITERIA FOR PARTNERSHIP EXISTENCE UNDER THE

UPA

The UPA requires no formal written or oral agreement as a prerequisite
to the establishment of a partnership. Rather, partnership existence may be
implied from the attendant circumstances or conduct of the parties.7o Where
a husband and wife arrange their affairs in a manner that gives the impression of a partnership a court should infer that such a partnership exists.7'

61.

FLA. STAT. §620.59 (Supp. 1972).

62. E.g., FLA. STAT. §620.615 (Supp. 1972).
63. E.g., FLA. STAT. §620.60 (Supp. 1972).
64. E.g., FLA. STAT. §620.71 (Supp. 1972).
65.
66.

FLA. STAT. §620.62 (Supp. 1972).
FLA. STAT. §741.23 (1971).

67. See, e.g., Hogan v. Hogan, 234 Ark. 383, 352 S.W.2d 184 (1961).
68. See Silliman, supra note 20, at 286.
69. E.g., FLA. STAT. §620.645 (Supp. 1972) provides: "The rights and duties of the partners
in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them,
by the following rules ....
"
70. See, e.g., Miller v. Salabes, 225 Md. 53, 169 A.2d 671 (1961); Gohen v. Gravelle, 411
Pa. 520, 192 A.2d 414 (1963).
71. See, e.g., Raymond S. Roberts, Inc. v. White, 117 Vt. 573, 97 A.2d 245 (1953).
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Under the UPA a partnership is defined as: "[A]n association of two or
more persons to carry on a business for profit as coowners."7 2 The term
"business" is defined as having "no definite or legal meaning."73 Thus, under
the UPA almost any type of business activity carried on by husband and
wife for profit can be the subject of a partnership.
The statute74 seemingly requires spouses to co-own the business property
before a partnership can exist, although co-ownership in the form of tenancy
by the entireties is not necessary. The Act simply provides that all property
originally brought into the partnership or subsequently acquired by purchase
is partnership property.7 5 Furthermore, each partner is deemed a co-owner
with his partners of specific partnership property.78

A requirement that the property be owned as a tenancy by the entireties
could lead to inequitable results. For example, if the wife owned all the
business property but the husband performed all the business work, requiring ownership by the entireties as a prerequisite to partnership formation
would prevent the husband from acquiring a partner's share upon dissolution of the relationship. The form in which property is legally owned should
not control what substantively exists.
The UPA further provided that receipt by a person of a share of the
profits is prima facie evidence he is a partner.77 Such language would include
the application of business proceeds toward maintenance of a home and
family.78 The housewife certainly partakes of the benefits derived from such
an application of the profits. In sum, the UPA provides no insurmountable

barriers to the creation of an implied partnership. 79
PossILE

EFFECT OF THE

UPA

ACCOMPANYING PARTNERSHIP IMPLICATIONS

The implication of a husband-wife partnership would have important
attendant effects under the UPA. Of primary importance is the Act's effect
on debtor-creditor relationships. Under the Act partners co-own specific partnership property as tenants in partnership,8° although each partner has an
equal right with his co-partners to possess specific partnership property for
partnership purposes.-1 A partner's individual interest, however, is his share
of the profits and surplus.8 2 This interest is subject to a charging order of

72. FrA. STAT. §620.585(1) (Supp. 1972).
73. BLACK'S LAw DIcinoNARY 248 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).

74. FLA. STAT. §620.585(1) (Supp. 1972).
75. FLA. STAT. §620.595(1) (Supp. 1972).
76. FLA. STAT. §620.68(1) (Supp. 1972).

77.

FLA. STAT. §620.59(4) (Supp. 1972).
78. See Raymond S. Roberts, Inc. v. White, 117 Vt. 573, 97 A.2d 245 (1953). But see
Shawneetown Feed & Seed Co. v. Ford, 468 S.W2d 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
79. See, e.g., Hoist v. Butler, 379 Pa. 124, 108 A.2d 740 (1954) (decided under the UPA).
80. FLA. STAT. §620.68(1) (Supp. 1972).
81. FLA. STAT. §620.68(2)(a) (Supp. 1972).
82. FLA. STAT. §620.685 (Supp. 1972). Florida law prior to enactment of the UPA was

that each partner's interest comprised "that undivided portion of the partnership assets
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the court on application by any judgment creditor of the individual partner,8 3 but specific partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution except for claims against the partnership.84
Thus, under the UPA spousal partnership property cannot be reached by
either spouse's non-partnership creditors prior to dissolution of the partnership. Likewise, after dissolution a non-partnership creditor of either spouse
could reach only the debtor spouse's distributive share of the partnership
property. A similar result obtains under Florida law apart from the Act.
Prior to adoption of the 1968 constitution, section 708.02 of the Florida
Statutes provided that separate property of a wife was not liable for the debts
of her husband without her written consent executed with all the formalities
of a deed.8 5 In Emhart Corp. v. Brantley 6 both the husband and wife signed
and sealed a promissory note as makers but failed to execute the note with
the formalities of a deed. The court nevertheless found section 708.02 incon8 7
sistent with the 1968 constitution and held the wife liable for the debt.

Thus, notwithstanding the lack of a statute shielding the wife from liability,
under the Emhart rationale some written consent as evidence of a clear
intent to undertake liability for a husband's debt is still a condition precedent to the wife's liability.88 Should an assiduous creditor invoke an implied partnership approach, however, separate property of the wife could
conceivably be subjected to liability absent any actual intent on her part to
act as surety for the debt. A husband's creditor could reach the wife's property by showing (a) the spouses are implied partners, (b) the property
owned by the wife is specific partnership property, and (c) the husband's
debt is a partnership debt.89

which may remain after all partnership debts are paid." B.A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla.
308, 14 So. 2d 669 (1943). Consequently, judgment creditors of individual partners were able
to terminate the partnership by subjecting the partner's interest to execution. Id. Forced
dissolution of the partnership by such a process is no longer possible under the UPA. But
see note 84 infra.
83. FLA. STAT. §620.695 (Supp. 1972). Compare Florida's garnishment process whereby
collection of debts due the debtor in futuro cannot be accomplished. See Williams, Creditors'
Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 60,
73 (1972).
84. FLA. STAT. §620.68(2)(c) (Supp. 1972). This procedure eliminates the common law
method of allowing creditors of partners in their individual capacities to disrupt partnership
business by levying on partnership property. See Gose, The Charging Order Under the Uniform PartnershipAct, 28 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1953). However, creditors of an individual partner
may terminate the partnership by having the partner adjudged bankrupt, since bankruptcy
of a partner dissolves the partnership by operation of law. FLA. STAT. §620.71(5) (Supp. 1972).
85. Fla. Laws 1927, ch. 2, §5866, at 1924 (repealed 1970). See, e.g., Heinl v. Fulmervance,
Inc., 255 So. 2d 281 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
86. 257 So. 2d 273 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
87. Id. at 276.
88. But cf. Heath v. First Nat'l Bank, 213 So. 2d 883 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968), where a
wife's signature was insufficient to validate an alleged mortgage on homestead property.
89. FLA. STAT. §620.68(2)(c) (Supp. 1972) permits a judgment creditor of a partnership
to levy on specific partnership property without first obtaining a charging order.
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Recognizing the potential severity of this creditor's remedy, some courts
have employed escape devices to prevent injustice. For example, in Ogallala
Fertilizer Co. v. Salsberry9o many conventional partnership characteristics
were present. 91 The husband had contracted business with a local fertilizer
store and at the time of his demise was heavily indebted to the retailer. Admitting the existence of a partnership and benefit accruing to it from the
sale of fertilizer, the Nebraska supreme court nevertheless refused to hold the
widow liable, reasoning that the retailer had dealt with the husband in his
individual capacity and not as a partner. 92 The court thus concluded that
no claim existed against the partnership.
Another device is to find that no partnership exists. For example, in
Shawneetown Feed & Seed Co. v. Ford93 spouses co-owned and operated a
grocery store that was indebted to a milling company. Although the couple
had a bank account, the court concluded that the wife's access to the account
for family expenses did not constitute receipt of a share of the store's profits
so as to create prima fade proof of a partnership within the scope of the
Missouri Uniform Partnership Act. 94 The wife's use of the bank account was
held to be nothing more than a means by which the husband carried out his
support obligation. As no profit-sharing could be shown, the existence of a
partnership was not established and no liability for business debts was imposed upon the wife. 95
The Ford rationale, however, could be a sword wielded against the wife
as well as a shield in her behalf. For example, in an effort to prevent the
utilization of an implied partnership theory by the wife upon dissolution of
the marriage, a husband could use Ford as a defense to the formation of
such a partnership. On the other hand, the wife could attack the rationale
of the Ford case. Contemparary legal thought undermines the thesis that a
husband shoulders sole responsibility for the support of the family.98
Of ancillary importance in the debtor-creditor field is the possibility of a
creditor having access to all marital property without being hindered by a
surviving spouse's dower right. 97 Legal title to business property may be held
in the name of one spouse. 98 Assuming an implied partnership exists between
the spouses, the death of the spouse holding legal title would result in dis-

90. 186 Neb. 537, 184 N.V.2d 729 (1971).
91. The wife and her deceased husband operated a farm, and farm income was deposited

in a joint checking account from which both husband and wife drew to pay personal and
farm expenses. The wife owned part of the land individually and co-signed on certain notes

in procuring loans to finance the farm's operation. Id.
92.
93.
94.
But see
95.

Id. at 540, 184 N.W.2d at 731.
468 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
Mo. REV. STAT. §358.070(4) (1959), identical to FLA. STAT. §620.59(4) (Supp. 1972).
Raymond S. Roberts, Inc. v. White, 117 Vt. 573, 97 A.2d 245 (1953).
468 S.W.2d at 56.

96. See Brown, Emerson, Falk, Freedman, The ERA: A Constitutional Basis for Equal

Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 946 (1971).
97. See Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 107, amending FLA.
98. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.

STAT.
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solution of the partnership. 99 Under Florida's dower statute the survivor
would seemingly acquire a one-third interest in the business property free
from liability of any debts of the decedent and all costs, charges, and expenses
of administration.' 00 The UPA, however, provides: "A partner's right in
Conceivably, then,
specific partnership property is not subject to dower."''
a creditor of the decedent could argue that the surviving spouse in an implied
partnership could not claim a dower share. Such an argument would have
merit if the statute were construed as prohibiting dower from ever attaching
to specific partnership property. 10 2 An interpretation that dower may not
attach to the hinderance of another partner's interest is, however, preferable.10 3 Such an interpretation would permit a surviving spouse to claim a
04
dower interest in the decedent's property.1
Of additional concern is the UPA's effect on binding one spouse-partner
for the acts of the other. The Act provides that partners are jointly and
severally liable for the tort of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the
business of the partnership or with co-partner authority, 05 and for a partner's breach of a fiduciary duty within the scope of his apparent authority. 0 6
Where the spouses both work in the business the imposition of liability does
not present a great problem. But where the wife's contribution to the business consists of maintaining the home while the husband operates the business, the scope of liability imposed is nearly indeterminable. If one views
such a contribution as sufficient to create a partnership right in the wife,
nearly all of her acts could be considered as being within the course of the
partnership business. Hence, these rules could unjustifiably impose liability
in such a context and their strict application is not advocated.
Under certain circumstances the marital relationship may also serve as a
conduit for imputing the negligence of one spouse to the other.10 7 Despite
the fact that contributory negligence is no longer a complete defense to a
tort action, imputing a negligent spouse's conduct to the non-negligent
spouse will decrease the recovery of the non-negligent spouse based on the
08
If partnercomparative negligence formula set forth in Hoffman v. Jones.

FLA. STAT. §620.71(4) (Supp. 1972).
FLA. STAT. §781.34 (1971), as amended, Fla.
101. FLA. STAT. §620.68(2)(e) (Supp. 1972).

99.

100.

Laws 1973, ch. 73.

102. See In re Dumarest's Estate, 146 Misc. 442, 443, 262 N.Y.S. 450, 452 (Sur. Ct. 1935)
(no conjugal rights may vest in partnership property).
103. See, e.g., Kelley v. Shields, 448 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1969).
104. Of course, if the property were owned as a tenancy by the entirety a creditor
would be precluded from levying on the property for a debt of one of the tenants. See France
v. Hart, 170 So. 2d 52, 53 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
105.
106.

FLA. STAT. §620.62 (Supp. 1972).
FLA. STAT. §620.625 (Supp. 1972). Additionally, FLA. STAT. §620.63

(Supp. 1972)

makes partners jointly liable for breach of a partnership contract. Nevertheless, some courts
hold partners jointly and severally liable for partnership debts despite the wording of the
statute. See, e.g., Raymond S. Roberts, Inc. v. White, 117 Vt. 573, 578, 97 A.2d 245, 248 (1953)
(dictum).
107. See, e.g., Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
108. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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ship implication between spouses is extended into this field, harsh results
could occur. In negligence cases the relationship between spouses must comprise a joint enterprise or adventure2 9 before the negligence of one spouse
will be imputed to the other.-O The traditional requisite components of a
joint enterprise are: (a) an express or implied agreement, (b) community
of interests in objects or purposes, and (c) equal authority, or a joint right
of direction and control.,", A joint adventure is thus identical to a partnership, with the exception that it is formed to engage in a sole transaction
while a partnership may exist indefinitely. 12 Thus, establishing a husbandwife partnership yields a dear basis for imputing the negligence of one
spouse to the other.
However, under present Florida law the marital relationship alone is
not a sufficient basis for the imputation of negligence. 1 3 There must be a
sufficient community of interests between spouses so as to create a common
or joint enterprise beyond that of the marriage.1 4 In cases where negligence
has been imputed the community of interests involved contained the elements of the subsequent cause of action alleged by the non-negligent spouse.
For example, a wife's damage suit for the death of her child was barred
because the community of interests shared with her negligent husband was
the custody of the child."2 Similarly, a wife's damage suit for injuries sustained in an automobile accident was barred by the contributory negligence
of her driver-husband because the community of interests shared by the
spouses was operation of the motor vehicle. 1 6 Theoretically, it is possible to
impute negligence under an implied partnership theory without establishing
such a nexus. 1: Under such a theory, however, the spouse's negligence would
be imputed to the other spouse largely on the basis of the martial relationship, a result consonant with neither contemporary law" s nor concepts of
fundamental fairness.
Finally, implying an interspousal partnership may deprive spouses of
the protection of homestead exemption laws. This problem could be particularly acute if the spouses live in the same building where the family busi-

109. A joint enterprise differs from a joint adventure in that the former may be a
mutual undertaking for pleasure or profit, while the latter requires the objective of profitmaking. See Note, Joint Enterprise in the Field of Automobile Accident Litigation, 7 U. FLA.

L. REv.69 (1954).
110.
822 (4th
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Ward v. Baskin, 94 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1957); Conner v. Southland Corp., 240 So. 2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
Yokom v. Rodriguez, 41 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1949).
See Silliman, supra note 20, at 290.
Martinez v. Rodriquez, 215 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1968).
Id. at 207.
Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970).

116. Caliando v. Huck, 84 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Fla. 1949); cf. Weber v. Porco, 100 So. 2d
146 (Fla. 1958).
117. FrA. STAT. §620.60(1) (Supp. 1972) provides: "Every partner is an agent of the
partnership for the purpose of its business."
118. Martinez v. Rodriquez, 215 So. gd 805 (Fla, 1968).
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ness is maintained.11 9 The Florida constitution exempts homestead property
from forced sale or from any judgment or lien not resulting from taxes or
assessments or from obligations incurred because of the property, such as a
mortgage or judgment to recover repair costs.1 20 Nevertheless, it is well-settled

under early Florida cases1 21 and the UPA122 that no such exemption inures
to partnership property. The rationale behind this rule is that the exemption contemplates the debtor may claim an interest only out of his own
property. 12' Partnership assets are not the property of any one partner, but
belong to the partnership entity.1 24 Strict application of this homestead
exception to implied partnership property would, however, be inequitable.
Perhaps an apportionment between living space and business space would
be appropriate in certain circumstances. In many instances, however, partition would be practically impossible. An interspousal partnership that must
resort to homestead exemption to prevent creditors from foreclosing on living
quarters will probably not be financially able to find new living facilities.
Consequently, the husband and wife will be forced to cohabit with whoever
buys in at the execution sale. In this context the homestead exemptionpartnership property struggle appears to defy resolution.125 Yet if the use of
the implied partnership is equitably confined to marriage termination cases
in which no other means is available to protect the wife adequately, then any
conflict with the homestead exemption will be avoided, since the two remedies
will be mutually exclusive alternatives for the court in situations where they
might otherwise be in conflict.
EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION

The UPA is replete with references to the equality of partners as regards
rights to specific partnership property.1 2 Furthermore, recent decisions of
Florida courts have recognized that husband and wife are to be placed on
an equal footing in the eyes of the law. 12 7 Consequently, upon dissolution
of an interspousal implied partnership, in the absence of any specific agreement or fact circumstances dictating otherwise, distribution of the partner119. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 186 Ark. 160, 52 S.W.2d 971 (1932) (family operated
a dry cleaning business downstairs and resided upstairs).
120. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4.
121.

See, e.g., State ex rel. Peck v. Bowden, 18 Fla. 17 (1881).

122. FLA. STAT. §620.68(2)(c) (Supp. 1972) provides: "When partnership property is attached for a partnership debt, the partners ... cannot claim any right under the homestead
or exemption laws."
123. State ex rel. Peck v. Bowden, 18 Fla. 17, 21 (1881).
124. Id. See also FLA. STAT. §620.595(1) (Supp. 1972): "All property originally brought
into the partnership or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the
partnership is partnership property." For a discussion of the entity and aggregate concepts
of a partnership, see Silliman, supra note 20, at 283.
125. Texas allows a partner to claim a homestead exemption in partnership property
when the partnership goes into bankruptcy. See, e.g., Phillips v. C. Palomo & Sons, 270 F.2d
791 (5th Cir. 1959).
126. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§620.585(1), .68(1), .68(2)(a) (Supp. 1972).
127. See, e.g., Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 1971).
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ship property should be in equal shares as nearly as practicable. 128 Specific
contributions of capital or services beyond that of an equal share should be
presumed to be a gift.129 Husbands and wives will never be truly equal in
the eyes of the law, and wives will continue to rely on judicial grace in the
form of alimony as compensation for efforts tendered during years of coverture unless such a method of property distribution, or its equivalent, is used
when a marital relationship is dissolved.
CONCLUSION

The implied partnership is a method by which a court of equity can
grant wife property rights that are rightfully hers upon termination of her
marriage. Conversely, the theory may deal with husbands more equitably
than they are now treated. The implied partnership theory is a hybrid of
the special equity, dower, and community property concepts. In contrast to
the special equity, the implied partnership does not require performance of
duties above and beyond those normally required of a spouse, nor must a
spouse necessarily overcome the presumption of a gift in order to be entitled
to a partnership share. Compared to dower, the implied partnership yields
a greater share of the property (one-half rather than one-third), and death
of the other spouse is not a prerequisite to the right vesting in the co-partner.
In community property jurisdictions, the spouse is always entitled to a onehalf interest in property acquired during the marriage. The implied partnership benefit, however, can inure only to the spouse in a family engaged in a
business.
The implied partnership concept does not lend itself well to statutory
delimitation. Initially, a court should presume that upon termination of a
marriage where a partnership is determined to exist, the property should be
equally divided. Nevertheless, the court should be cognizant that special
circumstances may exist that demand an unequal distribution of the marital
property. Correspondingly, the burden should be upon the party asserting
an unequal distribution to show that he or she is entitled to it.
The marital relationship lends itself well to commercial concepts embodied in the UPA and the implied interspousal partnership. Certain commercial statutory provisions are nevertheless at odds with the realities of
everyday marital life. It is within the power of a court of equity to apply
only those statutory principles that are just and fair in each situation. The
permutations of such conceivable situations make it impractical to attempt
formulation of definite rules with respect to judicial implication of a partnership between spouses. Utilization of equitable principles and responsiveness
to social change should, however, provide a solid judicial foundation for
successful implementation of the implied partnership concept in the area
of family businesses.
MICHAEL C. MUmHY
128.
129.

See, e.g., Hogan v. Hogan, 234 Ark. 383, 352 S.W.2d 184 (1961).
See Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 8,5t 831 (4th D,C.A. Fla. 1971).
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